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Recently some lawyers and statesmen have begun to
cite judgments of the International Court of Justice as
if they were decisive evidence of the content of international law. This trend, if it continues, will tend to diminish the influence of international law on the actions
of states and others, by arrogating the authoritative determination of the content of international law to a
tribunal that was never intended to generate rules of
universal application, is ill-equipped to do so, and
ought not usually be viewed as having done so, except
in very exceptional circumstances.
WHY PEOPLE EXAGGERATE THE COURT'S
AUTHORITY
The tendency to view the judgments of the International Court of Justice as if they were decisive evidence of
the content of international law arises by analogy with the
role of courts in certain western democracies, and particularly with that of the Supreme Court of the United States
of America, which gives final and decisive interpretations
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of the constitution and laws of the United States, including international law and treaties.' Collectively, these constitute the "supreme law of the land", and are binding
throughout the Union.2 As Chief Justice John Marshall
explained on behalf of a unanimous court in Marbury v.
Madison (1803) - - although "the people collectively have
an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness" as "supreme and paramount law", it
is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
say whatthethelawlaw
pound andtointerpret"
of is"
the and
land.'therefore to "exThe doctrine of the separation of powers, as embodied in the many written constitutions that have developed in the two-hundred years since Marshall wrote his
famous opinion, have confirmed the judiciary in most
such regimes as the ultimate arbiter of the content of
law. Legislatures draft statutes, according to this theory, but the judiciary says what the law is. So long as
the executive power in the state remains willing to enforce and to respect the courts' decisions, then law will
be whatever the courts say it is. Oliver Wendell
Holmes expressed the view of many advocates accustomed to litigating under separation-of-powers constitutionalist regimes when he said that the business of
lawyers is "the prediction of the incidence of the public
force through the instrumentality of the courts." Since
'Constitution of the United States of America (September 17, 1787) Article
II.
2 Ibid, Art. VI.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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"in societies like ours" the "whole power of the state
will be put forth to carry out their judgment and decrees." A strictly practical man, a "bad man" as Justice
Holmes put it, living under the rule of law and the
separation of powers of a modern constitutional state,
will pay attention to what courts say, and treat this as
"law", or suffer the consequences. 4
The United Nations Charter was drafted in the
same style and structure as the Constitution of the
United States of America, using much of the same vocabulary. "We the Peoples of the United Nations", echoed "We the People of the United States"6 in seeking to
establish conditions under which "justice and respect
for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained."7 Both
establish a "House of Representatives" (United States),
or "General Assembly" (United Nations).9 Both establish a "Senate" (United States)"' or "Security Council"
(United Nations)." Both establish an "executive"
(United States)2 or "secretariat" (United Nations)."
4
And both establish a "Supreme Court" (United States)
' Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", 10 HarvardLaw Review 457 (1897).
Charterofthe UnitedNations (June 26, 1945), Preamble.
'Constitution ofthe UnitedStates ofAmerica, Preamble.
Charter of the UnitedNations, Preamble. Cf Constitution of the Untied
States, Preamble and Article VI.
' Coniutionofthe UnitedStates, Article I.
Charterofthe UnitedNations,Chapter IV.
SConmitutionofthe United Stute Article I.
Charterof the UnitedNations, Chapter V.
mConstitution ofthe United States ofAmerica, Article II.
"Charter ofthe UnitedNations, Chapter XV.
mConstitution of the United States ofAmerica, Article III.
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or "International Court of Justice" (United Nations)."
The United States Supreme Court holds the ultimate
"judicial power of the United States"6 and the Interna-

tional Court of Justice is "the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations.""
THE ICJ WAS NEVER INTENDED TO
DETERMINE THE LAW
Notwithstanding its many similarities with ordinary
democratic constitutions, the Charter of the United
Nations did not create a new system of laws, and was
not intended to do so. The primary purpose of the
United Nations Charter was to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"", by "maintaining
international peace and security"" based on the "sovereign equality of all its members."20 While the United
Nations will "adjust" or "settle" those international disputes that might lead to a breach of the peace "in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law,"21 the Organization does not exist for the purpose
of enforcing international law, and will not always do
so. The General Assembly and Security Council are not
the world's legislature, the Secretary-General is not the
world's president, and the International Court of Justice is not the world's court, or the ultimate arbiter of
Charterof the United Nations, Chapter XIV.
Constitution ofthe United States ofAmerica, Article III.
"Charter of the UnitedNations, Chapter XIV.
6

Ibid , Preamble.
Ibid, Article 1.1.
a Ibid, Article 2.1.
SIbid, Artidce 1.1.

[44]
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international law, even under the terms of its own statute.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice
creates a body of fifteen judges," elected by majority
vote in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council,2 for nine-year terms, and eligible for reelection.4 In this, the International Court of Justice
differs from the supreme courts of modern constitutional democracies such as the United States, where
Justices are selected by democratically elected officials'
and hold their seats quam diu se bene gesserint, which is
to say, for life.21 The judges of the International Court
of Justice are selected with the significant participation
of the many non-liberal, non-democratic governments
that hold seats in the United Nations General Assembly
and Security Council, and inasmuch as the judges are
eligible for periodic re-election, they remain subject to
the continuing influence of non-democratic and illiberal regimes. This deprives the International Court of
Justice of the democratic legitimacy and independence
necessary before any court can deserve the deference of
its subjects. The International Court of Justice lacks the
basis in the people, collectively, that gave John Marshall's court its decisive authority.
The Court's own Statute recognizes this shortcom-

n Statuteof the InternationalCourt ofJustice, Artide 33.
Ibid Artidces IV,VIII, and X.
Ibid, Article 13.
"Constitution ofthe UnitedStates ofAmerica, Article H,cL 2.
Ibid., Artile I,c. 1.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY.

Volume 8 No. I

M.N.S. Sellers
ing, by extending the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice only to those cases "which the parties
refer to it", either directly, or by treaty. 7 Many cases
are not heard by the full court, but rather by smaller
chambers of judges approved by the parties to a particular dispute." In any case, the statute of the International Court of Justice makes it clear that the decisions
of the Court have "no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case."" According to the terms of its own statute, the International
Court of Justice will refer to judicial decisions, including its own, only as "a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law," on the same level of authority
as the teachings of publicists, and inferior to international conventions, custom, and the general principles
of law accepted by civilized nations.
THE ICJ IS ILL-EQUIPPED TO DETERMINE THE
CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The International Court of Justice is ill-equipped to
determine the content of international law for precisely
the same reasons that it is so well designed to "adjust"
or to "settle" international disputes, which is to say,
because it is subject to the political control and oversight of interested states. As part of the United Nations
System, the Court's primary emphasis is on the peaceful
settlement of disputes, and not on the enforcement of

'

Statute ofthe InernaionalCourtofJustiece, Article 36.

'o

WIbi,Artice 26.2.
Ibid, Article 59.
Ibid, Article 38.

[46]
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justice. Cases come before the Court only when parties
to a dispute have agreed that they should do so. This
implies a general willingness in advance to abide by its
decisions, but creates no actual mechanism for imposing unwelcome decisions of the International Court of
Justice on recalcitrant parties, unless the Security
Council makes an independent decision to do so, in
response to a threat to the peace.
The International Court of Justice is subservient in
the first instance to the Security CouncilP' and in the
second instance to those states that use it to resolve
their disputes. While the Court should arbitrate such
disputes "on the basis of international law," it may also
decide them ex aequo et bono, or on the basis of other
stipulations made by the parties.32 The settlement of
disputes within the United Nations System seeks solutions "by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security . . . are not endangered."33

This requires the International Court of Justice to consider the particular situation and relative power of the
parties, rendering all decisions of the Court too idiosyncratic to be decisive "except between the parties and
in respect of that particular case."Determining the content of law requires procedures
designed to elicit the objective requirements of justice
with greater accuracy and stability than would be possiCharterof the UnitedNatom, Artide 94(2).
of the InternationalCourtofJustice, Artide 38.
" Charterof the UnitedNations, Artide 2(3).
SStatute of the InternationalCourtofJustice, Article 59.
31

3Statute
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ble through the separate and independent judgment of
the law's own subjects, acting without legal control.
Domestic legal systems within states claim this authority, which they actually deserve only to the extent that
states maintain the liberal and democratic institutions
that justify political power. The International Court of
Justice makes no claim to decisive authority to determine the content of international law, because it lacks
the democratic and liberal foundations that would support such a claim. Instead, the International Court
offers a useful forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes between consenting states. Extending this authority to restrict the independent legal judgments of
democratic and liberal states would undermine international law, by separating the law from its ultimate
foundation in justice.
CONCLUSION
The authority of the International Court of Justice
has a limited scope, which does not extend beyond setding those disputes that states decide to set before it.
These settlements have no precedential value, and
should play no more than a subsidiary role even in the
court's own subsequent judgments, let alone anyone
else's. The International Court of Justice exists to settle
disputes, not to declare or to create international law.
Capacious claims for the court's decisive authority undermine this useful function, by giving the court's settlements an imperial power, which will dissuade many
just and law-abiding states from bringing their disputes
before it.
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